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Sheriff's Liability for Prisoner Suicide: Helmly v. Bebber
The alarming number of suicides in jails, I viewed in light of the striking
similarities in the victims' profiles2 and their methods of suicide,3 raises the issue
whether jailers can be held liable for their prisoners' suicides. In general, given
the intentional nature of the act, any liability for suicide rests solely with the
victim.4 Shifting the liability for prisoner suicide to jailers or custodians such as
sheriffs, police chiefs, or overseeing government entities, must be based on one of
two exceptions to this general rule: (1) negligence by the custodians that causes
a prisoner to commit suicide;5 or (2) negligent failure of the custodians to pre-
vent a prisoner's suicide.6
1. In 1979 there were 419 suicides in Unites States jails. NAT'L CENTER ON INSTITUTIONS &
ALTERNATIVES, AND DARKNESS CLOSES IN ... NATIONAL STUDY OF JAIL SUICIDES ii (1981)
[hereinafter cited as NATIONAL STUDY]. From 1972 to 1976, there were 70 suicides in North Caro-
lina jails and prisons. These suicides accounted for one-third of the total number of deaths (223) in
prisons and jails in this period. Hudson & Butts, Causes of Deaths in North Carolina Jails and
Prisons 1972-76, POPULAR GOV'T, Fall 1979, at 16, 16-17.
2. Of the 419 suicide victims in jails nationwide in 1979, 67.3% were white; 96.5% were male;
85.4% were below age 38; 69.8% were single, divorced, widowed, or separated; 73.6% were facing
charges for nonviolent crimes; 91.4% were awaiting trial at the time of death; and 59.2% were under
the influence of alcohol, drugs, or both at the time of incarceration. NATIONAL STUDY, supra note
1, at 18-28.
Of the 70 suicide victims in North Carolina jails and prisons from 1972 to 1976, 85% were
intoxicated, 77% were white males, and most were under age 40. Hudson & Butts, supra note 1, at
17.
3. Of the 419 suicides in jails nationwide in 1979, 95.9% were by hanging. Furthermore,
43.6% of the suicide victims used their bedding as the suicide instrument, and 43.6% used their
clothing, belt, or shoelaces. NATIONAL STUDY, supra note 1, at 30-32. Additionally, 27% died
within the first three hours of incarceration, and 5 1.1 % died within the first 24 hours of incarcera-
tion. Id. at 36-38; see also id. at 39-41 (table correlating suicide victims' length of incarceration by
type of crime committed).
Of the 70 suicides in North Carolina jails and prisons in 1972-76, 48.5% occurred in the first 12
hours of incarceration and 21% took place in the first 3 hours of incarceration. Moreover, 92.8% of
the prisoners hanged themselves and 41.5% of those who hanged themselves used their belts. Hud-
son & Butts, supra note 1, at 17.
4. See, eg., McLaughlin v. Sullivan, 123 N.H. 335, 337, 461 A.2d 123, 124 (1983); Falkenstein
v. City of Bismarck, 268 N.W.2d 787, 790 (N.D. 1978); PROSSER AND KEETON ON TME LAW OF
TORTS § 44, at 311 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER & KEETON]; Annot., 11
A.L.R.2d 751, 757 (1950); see also Schwartz, Civil Liability for Causing Suicide: A Synthesis of Law
and Pyschiatry, 24 VAND. L. REv. 217, 217 (1971) (acknowledging that courts shy away from im-
posing liability for the suicide of another because it is an intentional act by the deceased); Comment,
Civil Liability for Suicide: An Analysis of the Causation Issues, 1978 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 573 (evaluating
legal theories of recovery, their causal elements, and mechanics of proof in suicide cases).
5. This exception to the general rule that suicide is an intentional act and not the result of a
tort arises when a tortfeasor negligently causes a mental condition which results in an uncontrollable
impulse to commit suicide. See Falkenstein v. City of Bismarck, 268 N.W.2d 787, 790 (N.D. 1978);
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § 44, at 310-11; Schwartz, supra note 4, at 226-32; Comment,
supra note 4, at 574-76; Comment, Civil Liability for Causing or Failing to Prevent Suicide, 12 LoY.
L.A.L. REV. 967, 974-83 (1979); Annot., supra note 4, at 756 (1950); cf McLaughlin v. Sullivan, 123
N.H 335, 337-39, 461 A.2d 123, 124 (1983) (recognizing the exception but emphasizing that it is a
very narrow theory of liability).
6. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 245-55 (recognizing an affirmative duty to prevent suicide for
liquor dispensers, pharmaceuticals dispensers, psychiatrists, hospitals, and those in certain other
custodial relationships); Comment, supra note 4, at 581-83 (courts recognize a duty to prevent sui-
cide for hospitals, doctors, hotels, employers, and jailers); Note, Custodial Suicide Cases: An Analyt-
ical Approach to Determine Liability for Wrongful Death, 62 B.U.L. REV. 177, 178-94 (1982)
(analyzing general principles of liability in custodial settings and the relevant case law); Annot., 79
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In Helmly v. Bebber7 the North Carolina Court of Appeals joined jurisdic-
tions recognizing the duty of a sheriff or other jail custodian to take reasonable
steps to prevent a prisoner from committing suicide when the suicide is foresee-
able. This Note analyzes Helmly and the rationale behind the court's decision.
It concludes that the court correctly held that circumstances can impose on cus-
todians an affirmative duty to attempt to prevent a prisoner's suicide. The Note
also discusses guidelines that should be considered by the courts as they apply
this newly recognized theory of liability.
In Helmly the wife of a prisoner who hanged himself with his belt while in
the Alexander county jail brought a wrongful death action against Alexander
County, its sheriff, and the county commissioners, alleging that the defendants
were negligent in failing to take reasonable steps to prevent her husband's sui-
cide.8 Vernon Helmly hanged himself at about 10:30 p.m. on November 24,
1982, approximately an hour and a half after being placed in a jail cell. 9 Two
days earlier, on November 22, 1982, Helmly had checked himself into the psy-
chiatric ward of Catawba Memorial Hospital for drug abuse treatment. On the
day of his suicide, he discharged himself from the hospital, over the protests of
both his wife and doctor. After his discharge, Helmly returned to his home
intoxicated, assaulted his wife and daughter, broke dishes and furniture, and
drove his truck several times into the side of his house.10
Plaintiff called the sheriff's department from a neighbor's house, and two
deputies arrived at the Helmly's at 7:02 p.m.' The first deputy to arrive ob-
served Helmly approaching his wife, son, and daughter with a cinder block
raised above his head. The deputy subdued Helmly and placed him in the patrol
car where a second deputy smelled alcohol on Helmly's breath.' 2 While in the
car, Helmly still seemed to be angry at his family and apparently was satisfied to
learn from one of the deputies that he had damaged his truck by driving it into
the house.13
Helmly was brought before a magistrate at 8:45 p.m. 14 After being charged
with assault on a female and assault inflicting serious injury, he was placed alone
A.L.R.3d 1210, 1214-17 (1977) (liability of jailer for prisoner's self-inflicted injury). For a general
discussion of the specific duty of care necessary to prevent suicide, see Annot., supra note 4, at 775-
802. Two additional tort theories by which a person may be held liable for the suicide of another are
recognized. First, an actor who intends to inflict serious mental distress or physical suffering is liable
when such injury occurs and is a substantial factor in causing the victim to commit suicide. Com-
ment, supra note 4, at 576-77. In addition, employer liability for a suicidal death of an employee
may be imposed by a worker's compensation statute. Id. at 577-81.
7. 77 N.C. App. 275, 335 S.E.2d 182 (1985).
8. Id. at 275, 335 S.E.2d at 183.
9. Id. at 277-78, 335 S.E.2d at 184-85.
10. Id. at 276, 335 S.E.2d at 183.
11. Id. at 276-77, 335 S.E.2d at 183. Plaintiff spoke to the dispatcher at the sheriff's office
between three and five times before the deputies arrived. She told the dispatcher that her husband
had checked out of the psychiatric ward of the hospital, that he was dangerous and breaking every-
thing in the house, and that she was scared and her husband was crazy. Id.
12. Id. at 277, 335 S.E.2d at 183-84.
13. Id. at 277, 335 S.E.2d at 184.
14. Id.
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in a cell referred to as the "drunk tank."' The radio dispatcher, the only jailer
on duty, could not see the cell from his station. While before the magistrate,
Helmly had expressed a desire to stay in the jail overnight. At 10:25 p.m., how-
ever, Helmly told a deputy that he "wanted out of the jail."' 16 The deputy told
Helmly he would check on Helmly's request, and at 10:38 p.m., Helmly was
found hanging in the cell from his belt. Efforts to revive Helmly were unsuccess-
ful, and at 11:22 p.m. he was pronounced dead.
17
Plaintiff alleged additional facts to show that her husband's suicide should
have been foreseeable to the defendants. When plaintiff learned of Helmly's dis-
charge from the hospital on the day of the suicide, she called the Magistrate of
Alexander County inquiring about having her husband involuntarily committed
to a hospital.' 8 At the hospital following Helmly's arrest, plaintiff's daughter
told one of the deputies that Helmly needed "mental help" and that "he was
dangerous to himself and others."' 19 Also, when appearing before a magistrate
between 9:50 p.m. and 10:15 p.m., the plaintiff and her neighbor had related
Helmly's history of alcoholism and his recent threats of suicide.20 The magis-
trate had shared these statements with the deputies at the jail immediately before
Helmly was found hanging.2 1
Defendants moved for summary judgment, alleging that plaintiff's evidence
was insufficient to show that Helmly's suicide was foreseeable. Specifically, de-
fendants argued that the mere statement that Helmly was "dangerous to himself
and others" was insufficient to put the deputies on notice that Helmly was sui-
cidal.22 The trial court granted defendants' summary judgment motion.23
The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of the county and
the county commissioners stating that "plaintiff [had] failed to produce evidence
which would prove that [they] had any duty which was not met."'24 As to the
15. Id. Helmly was the sole occupant of the cell. A closed circuit monitoring system had been
installed in the jail, but was not operating at the time of Helmly's arrest. Id. at 277-78, 335 S.E.2d at
184.
16. Id. at 278, 335 S.E.2d at 184.
17. Id. at 278-79, 335 S.E.2d at 184-85.
18. Id. at 276, 335 S.E.2d at 183. Plaintiff apparently informed the magistrate that her husband
had checked out of the psychiatric ward of Catawba Memorial Hospital against his doctor's wishes,
that he had been drinking, that he had been taking drugs, and that he was "dangerous to himself and
others." Id.
The North Carolina involuntary commitment statute provides that anyone can inform a magis-
trate by affidavit that an individual is mentally ill or dangerous to himself and that the magistrate
can accordingly order the individual to be examined by a physician or psychologist. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 122C-261 (Supp. 1985). In Helmly, however, the magistrate informed plaintiff that he
lacked jurisdiction and that she would have to call the magistrate in Catawba county where her
husband was then located. Helmly, 77 N.C. App. at 276, 335 S.E.2d at 183.
19. Helmly, 77 N.C. App. at 277, 335 S.E.2d at 184.
20. Id. at 278, 335 S.E.2d at 184. Plaintiff was before the Alexander County magistrate with
whom she had apparently spoken earlier in the day. Prior to plaintiff's arrival, the deputy who had
been with the plaintiff at the hospital told the magistrate of plaintiff's desire to obtain psychiatric
treatment for Helmly. Id. Plaintiff admitted that her appearence before the magistrate was the first
time she had told a law enforcement official that Helmly might try to commit suicide. Id.
21. Id. at 278, 335 S.E.2d at 184-85.
22. Id. at 282, 335 S.E.2d at 186.
23. Id. at 275-76, 335 S.E.2d at 183.
24. Id. at 283, 335 S.E.2d at 187. It is unclear why the county and the commissioners were not
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sheriff, however, the court reversed summary judgment, holding that whether it
was foreseeable to the custodian that the prisoner might commit suicide and
whether reasonable care was exercised to prevent this harm were questions of
fact for a jury.25 The court imposed a standard of reasonable care on custodi-
ans, stating that "[u]nder the circumstances... plaintiff was not required to use
the magic word 'suicide' in order to get to the jury" on the question of
foreseeability. 26
Several North Carolina statutes help delineate the duty that jail custodians
owe their prisoners. North Carolina General Statutes section 153A-216 pro-
vides that "[local confinement facilities should... protect the health and wel-
fare of prisoners and provide for their humane treatment." 27 Also, section
153A-224 states that "personnel shall supervise prisoners closely enough to
maintain safe custody and control and to be at all times informed of the prison-
ers' general health and emergency medical needs."' 28 Arguably, the protection
of a prisoner's health as prescribed by section 153A-216 includes the prevention
of harm or death even if self-inflicted. Moreover, a literal interpretation of sec-
tion 153A-244 suggests that jail personnel are required to maintain constant su-
pervision of their prisoners, for only by maintaining constant supervision can jail
custodians be aware "at all times" of their prisoners' general health needs.
At common law sheriffs are liable for acts of their deputies in the line of
duty and within the scope of their authority.2 9 In contrast, the county usually
enjoys governmental immunity from tort liability, which shields it from liability
for the tortious acts or negligence of its officers or agents. 30 Statutory authority,
however, permits a county to insure itself and its officers for tort liability; if a
county chooses to insure itself under this statute, the county's governmental im-
munity is waived to the extent of the insurance coverage. 3 1
held liable. If the sheriff, as an employee of the county, is liable, it seems that the county should be
liable on a respondeat superior theory. See M. Smith, Civil Liability of the County and County
Officials (1985) (U.N.C. Inst. of Gov't unpublished manuscript) (examining the civil liability of
counties, county officers, and employees under North Carolina and federal law).
There are two theories under which the county may avoid liability. First, a county government
is immune from suit in North Carolina except to the extent it purchases liability insurance. See infra
notes 30-31 and accompanying text. Second, counties may not be liable for damages resulting from
activities in jails because operating a jail is a traditional governmental function rather than a proprie-
tary function of the county. See Smith, supra, at 9.
25. Helmly, 77 N.C. App. at 282-83, 335 S.E.2d at 186-87.
26. Id. at 282, 335 S.E.2d at 187.
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-216 (1983).
28. Id. § 153A-224.
29. See, eg., Davis v. Moore, 215 N.C. 449, 451, 2 S.E.2d 366, 367-68 (1939) (sheriff liable for
authorized acts of his deputy); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 162-24 (Supp. 1985) ("[t]he sheriff may
not delegate to another person the final responsibility for discharging his official duties, but he may
appoint a deputy or employ others to assist him in performing his official duties").
30. Hayes v. Billings, 240 N.C. 78, 81 S.E.2d 150 (1954).
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-435 (1983) provides that "a county may contract to insure itself
and any of its officers, agents, or employees against liability .... Purchase of insurance pursuant to
this subsection waives the county's governmental immunity, to the extent of the insurance coverage,
for any act or omission occurring in the exercise of a governmental function." See Harper, Statutory
Waiver of Municipal Immunity Upon Purchase of Liability Insurance in North Carolina and the
Municipal Liability Crisis, 4 CAMPBELL L. RnV. 41, 54-71 (1981); Comment, Local Government
Sovereign Immunity: The Need for Reform, 18 WAKE FOREsT L. RaV. 43, 52 (1982). City govern-
1986] TORT LA4W 1523
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It is also well established at common law that a sheriff is responsible for the
care and custody of prisoners in the county jail.32 Although Helmly presents a
case of first impression in North Carolina as to whether a sheriff or other jail
custodian has a duty to prevent a prisoner's suicide, several cases have examined
a custodian's duty to prisoners in other respects. In addition to establishing the
duty to provide for a prisoner's medical needs, these cases establish that a custo-
dian has a duty to protect a prisoner from other dangerous prisoners and from
hazardous jail conditions, particularly when a prisoner lacks sufficient physical
or mental capacity to provide the protection. For example, in State ex. reL
Dunn v. Swanson 33 the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized a private
cause of action against a sheriff who negligently allowed a prisoner to be killed
by another prisoner. The sheriff placed a sick prisoner who was in a helpless
condition in a cell with a man whom the sheriff knew to be violently insane.
During the night the violent prisoner killed the weak prisoner with a leg from a
table in the cell. 34 The court in Dunn indicated that a sheriff's liability for inju-
ries sustained by a prisoner as a result of the sheriff's negligence in failing to
prevent the willful acts of a third party was equal to the liability for the sheriff's
own willful acts.35
Similarly, in State ex. rel. Hayes v. Billings36 the parents of a man who had
suffered a nervous breakdown, was mentally unbalanced, and was oblivious to
any danger contacted a sheriff to request that their son be placed in a safe place
where he would be unable to harm himself. Aware of the man's condition, the
sheriff placed the man in the jail but did not lock him in a cell, leaving him free
to roam in an upstairs hallway. While unsupervised, the prisoner fell down a
winding stairway to a concrete floor approximately twelve feet below and suf-
fered injuries from which he eventually died.37 The court in Hayes recognized a
wrongful death cause of action in negligence against the sheriff.38
ments also waive tort immunity by purchasing liability insurance. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485
(1982).
32. E.g., Indiana ex rel Tyler v. Gobin, 94 F. 48 (C.C.D. Ind. 1899). Gobin, an often-cited case,
speaks of this duty as follows:
If the law imposes a duty of care in respect of animals and goods which [a sheriff] has
taken into his possession by virtue of his office, why should not the law impose the duty of
care upon him in respect of human beings who are in his custody by virtue of his office? Is
a helpless prisoner in the custody of a sheriff less entitled to his care than a bale of goods or
a dumb beast?... When a sherif, by virtue of his office, has arrested and imprisoned a
human being, he is bound to exercise ordinary and reasonable care, under the circum-
stances of each particular case, for the preservation of his life and health.
Id. at 50; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 162-22 (Supp. 1985) ("[the sheriff shall have the care and custody
of the jail in his county; and shall be, or appoint, the keeper thereof"); see also State v. Jones, 41
N.C. App. 189, 254 S.E.2d 234 (1979) (applying § 162-22).
33. 217 N.C. 279, 7 S.E.2d 563 (1940).
34. Id. at 280, 7 S.E.2d at 564.
35. Id.; see also Davis v. Moore, 215 N.C. 449, 2 S.E.2d 366 (1939) (cause of action against
sheriff for deputy's negligence in slamming cell door on prisoner's thumb, thereby severing it),
36. 240 N.C. 78, 81 S.E.2d 150 (1954).
37. Id. at 79, 81 S.E.2d at 151.
38. Id. at 81, 81 S.E.2d at 152-53. If this case had involved an intentional act by the prisoner, it
might be dispositive. There is no indication in the opinion, however, that it was suicide rather than
an accident.
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It is also clear that a jailer must provide necessary medical attention to a
prisoner. In Spicer v. Williamson,39 an action by a doctor against a sheriff and
the county to recover expenses for the treatment of one of their prisoners, the
court stated that "[ilt is clearly the duty of the board of commissioners of a
county ... to provide for necessary medical attention to a prisoner confined in
the county jail." 4° The court reasoned that "the prisoner by his arrest is de-
prived of his liberty for the protection of the public; it is but just that the public
be required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of
his liberty, care for himself."'4 1
In an analogous North Carolina case, the court in Pangle v. Appalachian
Hall42 asserted in dicta that psychiatric hospital personnel have a duty to pre-
vent a psychiatric patient from harming himself or committing suicide. In Pan-
gle a patient hanged himself with a rope one month after his personal doctor told
a hospital manager of the patient's suicidal tendencies. 43 Although it affirmed
nonsuit in favor of the defendant hospital because of plaintiff's deficient eviden-
tiary showing, the court in Pangle delineated a duty of ordinary and reasonable
care that a hospital owes its patients. The court concluded that "hospitals have
been held liable for the negligent failure of their officers or employees to guard
and restrain insane or delirious patients and prevent them from doing injury to
themselves." 44 Even though the relationship between a hospital and its patients
may be distinguished from that between a sheriff and his or her prisoners, Pangle
represents a relevant imposition by a North Carolina court of a duty on a custo-
dian to prevent suicide.
Because a failure to act is classified as a nonfeasance tort,45 a duty to take
reasonable steps to prevent another from committing suicide can be imposed
only if two requirements are met. First, there must be a "special relationship"
between the potential suicide victim and the party who bears the duty.4 6 Sec-
39. 191 N.C. 487, 132 S.E. 291 (1926).
40. Id. at 492, 132 S.E. at 294.
41. Id. at 490, 132 S.E. at 293.
42. 190 N.C. 833, 131 S.E. 42 (1925).
43. Id. at 833-34, 131 S.E. at 43.
44. Id. at 835, 131 S.E. at 43.
45. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § 56. Nonfeasance or passive inaction is an excep-
tion to the general tort forms that are based on misfeasance or active misconduct. Liability for
nonfeasance has been slow to receive recognition in the courts. Id. § 56, at 373. Successful nonfea-
sance actions first appeared in the fourteenth century in "public callings" cases in which a duty to
serve was imposed on all those in trades and professions necessary to the economy. See Arterburn,
The Origin and First Test of Public Callings, 75 U. PA. L. Rv. 411, 418-28 (1927). The develop-
ment of the assumpsit action also extended nonfeasance liability to those involved in a contract.
More recently courts have imposed an affirmative duty on those in relationships characterized by the
dependence of a plaintiff on a defendant who is in a position to exercise control and power over the
plaintiff. See SHAPO, THE DUTY TO ACT: TORT LAW, POWER AND PUBLIC POLICY (1977) (exam-
ining both the private and public duty to act).
46. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § 56, at 383-85; accord RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 314A, 315 (1965); see, eg., Figueroa v. State, 61 Hawaii 369, 376, 604 P.2d 1198, 1202
(1979) (juvenile detention home and resident youth); see also Comment, supra note 5, at 990-91
(discussing general characteristics of special relationships that give rise to liability); Note, supra note
6, at 181-84 (discussing liability for nonfeasance based on special relationships).
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ond, the attempted suicide must be foreseeable. 47 If these two prerequisites are
met, then the custodian's behavior will be assessed according to a reasonableness
standard of care. The custodian may raise contributory negligence and in-
dependent intervening cause as defenses to a failure to prevent suicide action.48
Because the law does not ordinarily require a person to come to the aid of a
fellow human being,49 there must be a custodial undertaking by a person or
institution and an accompanying assumptidn of responsibility for another's well-
being to create an affirmative duty to protect or help another person. 50 A com-
mon example of such a "special relationship" may exist between a doctor and a
patient.51 The relationship of a custodian such as a sheriff, police chief, or juve-
nile officer to persons in their custody also meets this test. In such relationships,
the incarcerator generally limits a prisoner's freedom of movement and freedom
of decision and therefore accepts responsibility for his or her care and
protection.
A leading case recognizing that the relationship of custodian to prisoner
gives rise to a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent suicide is Logue v. United
States.52 In Logue an eighteen year-old prisoner in a federal prison was diag-
nosed as psychotic with suicidal tendencies following a suicide attempt. After
being returned from a hospital to the prison, the prisoner hanged himself the
next day with a bandage. The prison officers, having knowledge of the prisoner's
diagnosis, were found negligent for failing to provide adequate surveillance of
47. Kanayurak v. North Slope Borough, 677 P.2d 893, 897 (Alaska 1984); Pretty on Top v.
City of Hardin, 182 Mont. 311, 316, 597 P.2d 58, 61 (1979); see Comment, supra note 5, at 991-93;
Note, supra note 6, at 185.
48. See infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
49. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § 56, at 375. For example, an expert swimmer has no
duty to come to the aid of someone drowning in shallow water. Id.
50. McLaughlin v. Sullivan, 123 N.H. 335, 338, 461 A.2d 123, 126, (1983). The court in Mc-
Laughlin recognized two classes of individuals that accept a custodial duty of care: (1) those with
actual physical custody of and substantial control over an individual, and (2) those specially trained
in medicine or mental health who have the precise duty and control necessary to care for the well-
being of a patient. See also Falkenstein v. City of Bismarck, 268 N.W.2d 787 (N.D. 1978) (uphold-
ing city's liability for inmate's suicide because sheriff's mistreatment of the prisoner contributed to
the mental condition leading to suicide).
51. For a discussion of liability stemming from such a relationship in North Carolina, see
Felman, Liability of Hospitals and Psychotherapists in Suicides, HEALTH LAW BULLETIN, Nov. 1985
(N.C. Inst. Gov't); see also Dinnerstein v. U.S., 486 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1973) (hospital staff respon-
sible for protecting patient from foreseeable suicide); Bornmann v. Great S.W. Gen. Hosp., Inc., 453
F.2d 616, 621 (5th Cir. 1971) (hospital under duty to protect patient from foreseeable self-inflicted
harm). Attorneys may also have such a relationship with their clients. See Annot., 41 A.L.R.4th
351 (discussing possible attorney liability for suicide of client); cf. McLaughlin v. Sullivan, 123 N.H.
335, 461 A.2d 123 (1983) (attorney not liable for suicide of client following client's allegedly wrong-
ful conviction).
52. 334 F. Supp. 322 (S.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 459 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1972),
vacated, 412 U.S. 521 (1973); see also Kanayurak v. North Slope Borough, 677 P.2d 893 (Alaska
1984) (jailer owes duty of care to prisoner to prevent foreseeable self-inflicted harm such as suicide);
Roberts v. Stokley, 388 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (sheriff liable for failure to follow
physician's instructions and failure to adequately supervise in order to prevent prisoner's suicide),
cert. denied, 394 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1981); Quinones v. Metropolitan Dade County, 366 So. 2d 535
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (cause of action recognized against county jail for failure to prevent
prisoner from hanging himself); McBride v. State, 52 Misc. 2d 880, 277 N.Y.S.2d 80 (Ct. Cl. 1967)
(supervisors of juvenile detention center liable for suicide of 15 year-old boy), affd, 30 A.D.2d 1025,
294 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1968).
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the prisoner.5 3 In discussing the government's duty, the Logue court noted that
"'once it became aware... of the psychotic condition and suicidal tendencies of
this prisoner, the reasonable care which the government was required to take
was that care necessary to make certain the prisoner did not commit suicide in
jail." 5 4
As Logue indicates, the duty of a custodian to prevent a prisoner's suicide
does not arise unless the suicide is foreseeable. The suicidal tendencies of a pris-
oner can manifest themselves in a number of ways: suicidal threats, previous
suicide attempts, medical diagnoses of suicidal tendencies, or general conditions
suggesting the potential for suicide. 5" Studies characterizing jail suicide victims
also suggest that jail officials should be able to identify prisoners with a high risk
of suicide. These studies may be of limited use to jailers, however, because they
characterize young, white, intoxicated males as the highest suicide risk.5 6 This
class no doubt describes a large percentage of all persons taken into custody
daily, the vast majority of whom do not attempt suicide.
Several cases have identified the foreseeability of the prisoner's suicide as
the controlling factor in establishing a custodian's duty to prevent the suicide.-
In Sudderth v. White57 the Kentucky Court of Appeals recognized a wrongful
death action against a jailer after a college student hanged himself with his belt
on the same day he was arrested. The court based its holding on evidence that
the jailer knew the deceased was suicidal, including evidence that the jailer knew
that the prisoner had previously cut his wrists.5 8 The court in Sudderth stated
that "if a jailer knows or has reason to believe that a prisoner might do harm to
himself, he has a duty to exercise reasonable care to assure that such harm does
not occur."
5 9
A prisoner's suicide is not always foreseeable.60 In Pretty on Top v. City of
Hardin,6 1 for example, a prisoner being held in a detoxification center stabbed
himself with a wooden paring knife. One jail worker knew that the prisoner had
the knife in his possession, but did not report this fact.6 2 The court affirmed
summary judgment for the defendant in a wrongful death action because
"[w]ithout a showing of 'special circumstances' which would elevate the defend-
53. The prisoner attempted suicide by slashing his arm, which prompted his transfer to a hospi-
tal for psychiatric diagnosis. The prisoner was returned to the jail contrary to the doctor's recom-
mended treatment. Logue, 334 F. Supp. at 324.
54. Id. at 325.
55. See Note, supra note 6, at 184.
56. See supra note 2.
57. 621 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
58. The court concluded that the jailer knew the student had previously attempted suicide by
cutting his wrists based on the sheriff's deposition testimony that "[s]omebody saw the cuts on his
hands and wrists that hadn't healed up yet good." The court also stated that the sheriff knew the
deceased was in poor physical condition since paramedics had come to treat him and he had been
taken to a hospital for treatment. Id. at 35.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Maricopa Co. v. Cowart, 106 Ariz. 69, 471 P.2d 265 (1970) (supervisors at juve-
nile home not liable for juvenile's suicide because they did not have information from which to
anticipate he would commit suicide).
61. 182 Mont. 311, 597 P.2d 58 (1979).
62. Id. at 313, 597 P.2d at 59.
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ant's duty of care and thereby create the possibility that defendant's acts were
the proximate cause of the death, the District Court was required to follow the
general rule that suicide is an intentional act."'63 In refusing to find that the
jailer had a duty to prevent the suicide, the court noted that the prisoner's gen-
eral demeanor, attitude, and activities were normal on each day prior to his
death, that the prisoner had no history of mental disease or emotional distur-
bances, and that he had not attempted suicide previously. 64
Similarly, in Delasky v. Hinsdale65 the court found that it was reasonable
for a jury to conclude that the prisoner's suicide was not foreseeable. In Delasky
the suicide victim was arrested at his home during a domestic dispute. At the
scene of his arrest, the victim, who was then intoxicated, uttered statements to
the effect of "shoot me or I'll take your gun and shoot myself," and then tried to
grab one of the officer's guns.66 Despite the victim's conduct, the court con-
cluded that it was reasonable for the police not to foresee his suicide because
there was no evidence that the prisoner was under the influence of alcohol when
he was put in his cell. Furthermore, the prisoner was calm, submissive and
apologetic when incarcerated. 67 The court further stated that "[p]olice officers
generally are not equipped to recognize and analyze emotional problems of per-
sons charged with crimes and particularly those who may appear to be
intoxicated."'68
If a prisoner's suicide is foreseeable, the duty imposed on a custodian is the
duty to take reasonable steps to prevent the suicide.69 A paramount issue cen-
ters on what level of conduct by a custodian will satisfy this standard of reason-
able care. Custodians may limit the opportunity for suicide attempts in their
jails in two ways: (1) by limiting a prisoner's access to dangerous instruments
and (2) by maintaining adequate surveillance of a prisoner.
Reasonable steps required of a custodian to limit a prisoner's access to dan-
gerous instruments may include removal of obviously dangerous weapons such
as knives and guns, as well as removal of less evident yet dangerous items such
as a prisoner's belt, shoestrings, and other items of clothing. 70 Cell bars, furni-
ture, and fixtures in the cell may provide opportunities for a suicide act. Fur-
thermore, bed sheets and prison clothing, unless designed to tear away under
stress, may be used by a prisoner in a suicide attempt. Problems with the struc-
ture of the jail itself may also give rise to liability for a prisoner's suicide.71
Adequate surveillance has also been identified as an element of the reason-
63. Id. at 318, 597 P.2d at 62.
64. Id. at 314, 597 P.2d at 60.
65. 109 Ill. App. 3d 976, 441 N.E.2d 367 (1982).
66. Id. at 978, 441 N.E.2d at 369.
67. Id. at 979, 441 N.E.2d at 370.
68. Id. at 982, 441 N.E.2d at 372.
69. Helmly, 77 N.C. App. at 280, 335 S.E.2d at 186.
70. See, eg., Sudderth, 621 S.W.2d at 35.
71. Wrongful death actions have also been brought against architects for negligence in design of
prison cells. See La Bombarbe v. Phillips Swager Assoc., 130 111. App. 3d 896, 474 N.E.2d 942
(1985) (court refused to impose liability because the duty was considered too great a burden on
architects).
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able care custodians must take to prevent a prisoner's foreseeable suicide.72 Sur-
veillance of a prisoner may be accomplished by putting suicidal prisoners in cells
visible to a jailer, by using closed-circuit cameras to monitor the cells, or by
frequently checking the cells. 73 It has also been noted that placing potential
victims in cells with other prisoners may decrease the opportunity for a suicide
attempt in some cases.74
Custodians are not insurers, however, of the safety of their prisoners and
will not be held liable if they exercise reasonable care.7 5 In Kozlowski v. City of
Amsterdam 76 the court recognized a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent a
prisoner's suicide, but affirmed a jury's finding that this duty was met even
though the prisoner was intoxicated when arrested, uncooperative during the
booking process, and expressive of suicidal tendencies shortly before hanging
himself with his socks. The court held that affirmative acts by the police in
removing the prisoner's shoes and belt, in calming him before placing him in his
cell, and in checking on him at thirty minute intervals were sufficient to meet the
custodian's duty of reasonable care.77
In contrast, the court in Sudderth held that a jury could infer that failure to
remove the prisoner's belt before placing him in a jail cell constituted a breach of
the jailer's duty to prevent the suicide. 78 The case law provides little guidance
on which items must be removed from a prisoner and precisely how much sur-
veillance of the prisoner is required to satisfy a custodian's duty to take reason-
able steps to prevent a suicide.
A final issue regarding custodial liability for a prisoner's suicide is the avail-
ability of two defenses to the action: contributory negligence 9 and independent
intervening cause.8 0 If a cause of action is allowed, a custodian may be able to
assert these defenses. For example, in City of Belen v. Harrell81 a seventeen
year-old prisoner arrested for armed robbery hanged himself with his shirt after
several threats to commit suicide. The prisoner had been stripped of all clothing
72. See Daniels v. Anderson, 115 Neb. 95, 99-100, 237 N.W.2d 397, 401 (1975).
73. See id.; Vienneau v. Shanks, 425 F. Supp. 676, 680 (W.D. Wis. 1977).
74. But see Delgado v. Cady, 576 F. Supp. 1446, 1451-52 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (court held double
celling of inmates with suicidal cellmates unconstitutional); Quinones v. Metropolitan Dade County,
366 So. 2d 535 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (prisoner hanged himself while in cell with 19 other
prisoners).
75. Cf. Broussard v. State, 356 So. 2d 94 (La. Ct. App. 1978), cert denied, 358 So. 2d 639 (La.
1978). In Broussard the patient committed suicide behind a privacy screen following two earlier
attempts. The court determined that the hospital had a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent the
patient's suicide and that this duty had been met. Id.
76. 111 A.D.2d 476, 488 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1985).
77. Id. at 478, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
78. Sudderth, 621 S.W.2d at 35.
79. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § 65. Contributory negligence is an act or omission
on the part of the plaintiff amounting to a want of ordinary care. In North Carolina contributory
negligence completely bars recovery if it contributes to plaintiff's injury as a proximate cause. Grif-
fen v. Ward, 267 N.C. 296, 148 S.E.2d 133 (1966).
80. See Hester v. Miller, 41 N.C. App. 509, 513, 255 S.E.2d 318, 321 ("In order to insulate the
negligence of one party, the intervening negligence of another must be such as to break the sequence
or causal connection between the negligence of the first party and the injury."), disc. rev. denied, 298
N.C. 296, 259 S.E.2d 913 (1979); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § 44;
81. 93 N.M. 601, 603 P.2d 711 (1979).
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except his undershorts after he arrived at the prison, but officials let him dress
for a visit from his mother and failed to retake his clothing.8 2 The court in
Harrell found that a custodian was not liable for a prisoner's suicide if the pris-
oner's conduct constituted contributory negligence or if the suicide was an in-
dependent intervening cause of death.83
The result in Harrell, allowing a defendant to assert these defenses in a
failure to prevent suicide case, seems anomalous in light of the foreseeability
requirement of this tort.84 These defenses seem inappropriate because the sui-
cide victim's act was intentional, and the duty of the defendant was to take
reasonable steps to prevent that foreseeable act. Normally, suicide is an unfore-
seen intervening act that absolves any earlier negligence on the part of a defend-
ant. However, failure to prevent suicide cases are an exception to this general
rule based on the victim's dependence on the custodian and the foreseeability of
the act.8 5 Thus, if a court finds that a prisoner's suicide was foreseeable, this
finding should eliminate the possibility of raising contributory negligence or in-
dependent intervening act as defenses.
Consideration of cases from other jurisdictions specifically addressing pris-
oner suicide liability and of North Carolina law relating to the duty of care
custodians owe their prisoners suggests that the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals reached a sound decision in recognizing custodial liability for failure to
take reasonable steps to prevent their prisoners from committing suicide. The
duty of custodians in North Carolina, to take steps to protect their prisoners
from attacks by third parties86 and to protect them from jail conditions, 87 may
reasonably be extended to include protecting prisoners from self-inflicted harm
when the suicidal act is foreseeable. Statutory guidelines concerning the health
and supervision of prisoners also support this duty.88 The rationale underlying
the imposition of this duty hinges on the custodian's control over the prisoner's
actions and surroundings and the prisoner's subsequent dependence on the
custodian.8 9
Application of tort principles to negligent failure to prevent suicide cases
will not be simple, however, and every case of a jail suicide should not proceed
to a jury on the question of the custodian's liability. A threshold that plaintiffs
must cross to state a cause of action should be established based on the founda-
82. Id. at 603, 603 P.2d at 713.
83. The court ordered a new trial because the trial court did not instruct the jury on issues of
contributory negligence and intervening cause. Id. at 604, 603 P.2d at 714; see also Lucas v. City of
Long Beach, 60 Cal. App. 3d 341, 351, 131 Cal. Rptr. 470, 476 (1976) (prisoner's suicide was super-
vening act relieving city of liability because suicide was not foreseeable).
84. If the intervening act and resultant injury could have been reasonably foreseen, it will not
insulate the person responsible for the prior negligence from liability. See Brown v. Atlantic Coast
R.R. Co., 276 N.C. 398, 404, 172 S.E.2d 502, 506 (1970).
85. See Lucas v. City of Long Beach, 60 Cal. App. 3d 341, 348, 131 Cal. Rptr. 470,474 (1976);
McLaughlin v. Sullivan, 123 N.H. 335, 337-38, 461 A.2d 123, 124-25 (1983).
86. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
89. See Pangle, 190 N.C. at 835, 131 S.E. at 43 (dicta identifying a hospital's duty of care to
prevent suicide).
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tional elements of the failure to prevent suicide tort: the special relationship of
the custodian and the person in his charge, the foreseeability of the suicide, and
the required standard of care.
The courts should carefully assess the specific relationship between a custo-
dian and his or her prisoners before imposing a duty to prevent suicide.90 The
nature of the custodial undertaking and the custodian's capabilities prescribe his
or her ability to recognize suicidal tendencies in a prisoner and the steps that
reasonably can be taken to prevent a suicide. Thus, the standard of care in this
tort must necessarily vary depending on the type of custodian involved.
The custodial relationship between a sheriff and his or her prisoners is prin-
cipally one of restraint and involuntary confinement. On behalf of the county,
sheriffs incarcerate persons charged with unlawful behavior. Although such im-
prisonment is generally not an undertaking for the benefit of the prisoner, a
sheriff is responsible for meeting the immediate physical needs of the prisoner
because of the prisoner's inability to do so.9 1 This relationship, based on control
and confinement, differs from other custodial relationships, such as that between
a hospital and a patient, in which the express undertaking is to provide care and
assistance and little restraint is involved.
Although it is difficult to draw a bright-line test in this area, the courts
should establish guidelines to identify those situations in which a sheriff or other
custodian should be able to foresee the likelihood of a prisoner's suicide. Actual
knowledge of suicide threats or attempts are obvious indications that should be
sufficient, though not necessary, to put any custodian, including sheriffs, on no-
tice that a prisoner may attempt suicide. Awareness of past mental illness or
current depression might also indicate to sheriffs that suicide is possible. Sheriffs
and similar custodians are not, however, as qualified to foresee suicide as those
custodians with more medical training and experience such as doctors and hos-
pital employees. 92 Therefore, they should not be expected to foresee suicide
based on subtle, less obvious characteristics of victims.
Although most persons taken into custody while under the influence of
drugs, alcohol, or both do not attempt suicide, an inordinately large percentage
of those who do commit suicide in jails are under the influence of such sub-
stances. 93 Thus, a prisoner's intoxication should alert custodians of the in-
creased likelihood of self-inflicted injury. In addition, findings that many
suicides occur in the early hours of incarceration 94 should alert custodians to the
increased risk during this time period.
Once the duty to prevent the suicide is imposed, the issue is what level of
90. The prerequisite of a special relationship will always be met in the sheriff/prisoner situa-
tion. Therefore, the court's only task will be to define that relationship and proceed to the question
of foreseeability.
91. See supra text accompanying note 41.
92. "As the particular relationship fails to resemble the caretaking relationship of hospital to-
ward patient, it becomes less likely that the person in a superior position will be able to recognize
another's suicidal tendencies." Comment, supra note 5, at 992.
93. See supra note 2.
94. See supra note 3.
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custodial conduct is required to satisfy the standard of reasonable care. Because
sheriffs and other custodians are not guarantors or insurers of their prisoners'
health and safety, 95 only reasonable conduct is required of them. 96 What is rea-
sonable can only be determined in light of the degree of foreseeability in a given
case and in light of the resources available to the custodian and his or her back-
ground and training.97
Determining what is reasonable under tort law requires a balancing test like
that first advocated by Judge Learned Hand.98 Under this balancing test, the
cost of a course of conduct is weighed against the probability of a harm occur-
ring absent that conduct, multiplied by the gravity of the potential harm.99 In
suicide cases, the gravity of the harm-death-is obviously great. Therefore,
some action is required by the custodian if the suicide is in any way foreseeable.
In almost all cases in which suicide is a possibility, sheriffs and other custodians
should be required to take relatively low cost preventive measures to assure the
prisoner's safety. 1°° As the level of foreseeability increases, the duty of custodi-
ans should also rise so as to require increased surveillance of the prisoner and
possibly to require obtaining assistance from mental health professionals. The
reasonableness of the custodian's actions should also be judged in light of the
financial and physical resources reasonably available to the custodian. Although
increased training and additional personnel would ameliorate the situation, these
factors should be considered in light of the costs that facilities can reasonably be
expected to bear.
Analyzing the facts of Helmly under the preceding analysis, a special rela-
tionship sufficient to invoke a duty to prevent suicide clearly existed from the
time of Helmly's arrest. Whether Helmly's suicide was foreseeable, however, is
more ambiguous. The custodians' knowledge of Helmly's drunkenness and his
violent behavior, and their possible knowledge of his history of psychiatric treat-
ment101 raised an issue of fact whether his suicide was foreseeable.
With respect to the reasonableness of the sheriff's conduct, the failure to
remove Helmly's belt 102 may be sufficient for a jury to find that the custodians
acted unreasonably. Other relevant factors in determining whether the custodi-
ans exercised reasonable care include the degree of foreseeability of Helmly's
suicide, the advisability of placing Helmly in a cell not visible to a jailer, and the
95. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
96. "A person or entity will not be held liable for another's suicide unless his conduct falls
below the standard of care imposed by the law." The occurrence of a suicide alone is not necessarily
an indication of negligence in custodian cases. Comment, supra note 5, at 993-95.
97. See Figuera v. State, 61 Hawaii 369, 380, 604 P.2d 1198, 1204 (1979) (reasonableness of
care in supervision should be determined in part by the nature of the institution).
98. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
99. If the burden of increased duty is less than the product of the probability of harm and the
severity of harm, the defendant is negligent. Id. at 173.
100. Such relatively affordable measures include removing possible instruments of suicide such
as guns, knives, and belts from prisoners and removing blunt objects and other possible suicide
instruments from cells. See supra text accompanying note 70.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 11-21.
102. See supra text accompanying note 17.
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fact the only jailer on duty was busy with other responsibilities. 10 3
In conclusion, the court of appeals in Helmly correctly reversed summary
judgment for the sheriff under applicable law. Although precision in applying
the test discussed above may be impossible, the factors identified should guide
courts in assessing liability for failure to prevent suicide. In general, the custo-
dial relationship and the foreseeability of the suicide are fundamental in deter-
mining whether to impose a duty of reasonable care to prevent suicide. A
careful review of the particular custodial relationship is essential to both a deter-
mination of the foreseeability of suicide and a delineation of the duty of reasona-
bleness that is required. In addition, use of a cost-benefit analysis can help
determine the reasonableness of the steps taken by the custodian. Courts must
recognize, however, that a facility cannot be expected to do more than its re-
sources allow. Courts should also recognize the inappropriateness of allowing
defendants to assert the contributory negligence and independent intervening act
defenses in these cases.
Adherence to these guidelines should help North Carolina courts as they
expand the liability of sheriffs and other custodians to include negligent failure
to prevent foreseeable suicides and other self-inflicted injuries. The interplay of
special relationships, foreseeability, and subsequent intentional self-harm in this
area of the law may present difficult problems in determining negligence and
proximate cause in cases involving suicide. By following these guidelines and
applying an appropriate tort framework, however, courts can successfully un-
ravel the current tangle of legal principles in this area and impose this newly
recognized liability in a just and consistent manner.
CHARLES MARK HOLT
103. See supra text accompanying note 16.
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Psychiatrists' Liability to Third Parties for Harmful Acts
Committed by Dangerous Patients
Under traditional common-law principles, unless a special relationship ex-
ists between two persons, neither has a duty to control the other's conduct or to
warn of the other's dangerous tendencies.' Generally referred to as the "no-
duty rule," 2 this doctrine has been greatly eroded by the recent receptivity of
courts to suits brought by victims of crime against the government or against
other third parties responsible for the negligent release into the community of a
dangerous person who later injures the victim.3 One dimension of this develop-
ment is a psychiatrist's liability to third parties. This liability is based on the
theory that the special relationship between psychiatrist and patient creates a
duty on the part of the therapist to protect others from a patient's violent con-
duct.4 In the recent decision of Pangburn v. Saad,5 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals held for the first time that a staff psychiatrist may be held liable to a
foreseeable victim injured by the wrongful release6 of a psychiatric patient. This
Note examines the scope of a psychiatrist's 7 liability to third parties and dis-
cusses the implications such liability may have on the mental health profession
in North Carolina.
1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965) (no duty to control the conduct of a
third person unless a special relationship exists between the actor and the third person, or a special
relationship exists between the actor and the other which gives rise to an expectation of protection)
[hereinafter cited as REsTATEMENT].
A special relationship exists when one person takes charge of another. Special relationships
traditionally recognized by courts are parent-child, employer-employee, carrier-passenger, inn-
keeper-guest, landlord-tenant, custodian-charge, and occupier of land-invitee. See PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 56, at 383-85 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER & KEETON].
2. See Note, Tort Liability in Georgia for the CriminalActs of 4nother, 18 GA. L. REV. 361,
362 (1984). Traditionally, common-law courts found a person liable if his or her affirmative acts-
misfeasance-injured another, but refused to impose liability for failure to take steps to protect an-
other from injury-nonfeasance. The reason for the distinction was that a defendant's misfeasance
created a new risk of harm to another, while mere nonfeasance caused no additional harm to the
plaintiff. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 56, at 373. This early distinction between action and
inaction often influences whether a duty exists today. Id.
3. See Tinsley, Government Entity's Liability For Injuries Caused By Negligently Released In-
dividual, 19 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 583, 590 (1979). For a discussion of cases imposing
liability for negligent failure to confine a dangerous person, see Carrington, Victims' Rights Litiga-
tion: .4 Wave of the Future?, I1 U. RicH. L. REv. 447, 459-65 (1977). The premise of "victims
rights" suits is that a criminal was in a position to injure the victim because some third party
breached a duty owed to the victim. Id. at 459.
4. Note, Liability of Psychiatrists For Violent Acts Committed By Dangerous Patients-
Durflinger v. Artiles, 33 U. KAN. L. REv. 403, 403 (1985).
5. 73 N.C. App. 336, 326 S.E.2d 365 (1985).
6. The term "release" covers a variety of programs whereby patients are given freedom from
24-hour confinement. Release programs include day-trips, weekend passes, outpatient treatment,
placement in community centers and other treatment methods allowing the patient to enjoy freedom
outside hospital confines. Comment, Psychotherapists' Liability For the Release of Mentally Ill Of-fenders: A Proposed Expansion of the Theory of Strict Liability, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 204, 204 n.2
(1977).
7. For the purposes of this Note, the terms "psychiatrist," "psychologist," "therapist," and
"psychotherapist" will be used interchangeably. Courts have disregarded the technical distinctions
between these professions when addressing the issue of psychiatrists' liability to third parties.
On March 3, 1982, Daniel Pangburn was involuntarily committed to a state
hospital in Goldsboro, North Carolina.8 His commitment was based on a his-
tory of emotional disorders and violent behavior which included physical attacks
on family members. 9 On the morning of March 26, 1982, Dr. Saad, a staff psy-
chiatrist at the hospital, informed Daniel's parents that Daniel was to be re-
leased. 10 The parents, fearful of their son, objected to Dr. Saad's decision and
asked that Daniel be placed in a chronic care unit.11 Daniel nonetheless was
released. That same night he attacked and stabbed his sister approximately
twenty times with a kitchen knife, inflicting "disfiguring and life-threatening
wounds." 12
The sister brought suit against Dr. Saad for injuries resulting from the
wrongful release of a psychiatric patient. 13 Defendant asserted that because he
was a staff psychiatrist at a state mental health facility he was cloaked with
immunity by statute and therefore free from personal liability. 14 The court of
appeals concluded that Dr. Saad had only a qualified immunity, 15 and addressed
the issue whether plaintiff had stated a cause of action against defendant on the
8. Pangburn, 73 N.C. App. at 347, 326 S.E.2d at 372.
9. Id. Daniel had been committed at least seven times since 1979. Id.
10. Id. at 347, 326 S.E.2d at 372-73.
11. Id. at 347-48, 326 S.E.2d at 373.
12. Id. at 337, 326 S.E.2d at 367.
13. Id. at 337, 326 S.E.2d at 366-67.
14. The relevant statute raised as a defense by Dr. Saad was N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-24 (1981)
which provided:
No administrator, chief of medical services or any staff member under the supervision
and direction of the administrator or chief of medical services of any State hospital shall be
personally liable for any act or thing done under or in pursuance of any of the provisions of
this Chapter.
Act of February 17, 1899, ch. 1, § 31, 1899 N.C. Sess. Laws 1, 16, repealed by Mental Health,
Mental Retardation, and Substance Abuse Act of 1985, ch. 589, § 2, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws, 299, 342.
Plaintiff asserted that this statute was invalid under the North Carolina Constitution on the grounds
that it violated the equal protection clause, N.C. CONST. art. I., § 19, and the "open courts" provi-
sion of N.C. CONST. art. I., § 18. Pangburn, 73 N.C. App. at 337, 326 S.E.2d at 366-67.
15. Pangburn, 73 N.C. App. at 346-47, 326 S.E.2d at 372. Before reaching the issue of the
scope of former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-24, the court addressed plaintiffs constitutional challenge.
Finding no suspect class or fundamental right, the court applied the rational basis test, under which
a statute must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. Id. at 340, 326
S.E.2d at 368. Noting that certain policy considerations justified providing immunity to state psy-
chiatrists, the court sustained the constitutionality of the statute. Id. With respect to plaintiffs
"open courts" challenge, the court, citing Lamb v. Wedgewood S. Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 302 S.E.2d
868 (1983), upheld the general assembly's right to define whether a particular cause of action is
cognizable or not. Pangburn, 73 N.C. App. at 340-41, 326 S.E.2d at 368-69.
After sustaining the constitutionality of the statute, the court defined the scope of immunity
provided by that statute. The court found persuasive authority in the recent judicial interpretation
of the exclusive remedy provision of the North Carolina Worker's Compensation Act, codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-1 to -122 (1985), because the exclusive remedy provision of that Act is con-
ceptually similar to § 122-24. Pangburn, 73 N.C. App. at 342-43, 326 S.E.2d at 370.
In Andrews v. Peters, 55 N.C. App. 124, 127-28, 284 S.E.2d 748, 750 (1981), disc. rev. denied,
305 N.C. 395, 290 S.E.2d 364 (1982), the court had held that the exclusive remedy provision, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1 (1985), did not preclude a tort suit by an employee against a co-employee who
had injured him intentionally. The North Carolina Supreme Court in Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C.
710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985) had expanded Andrews by holding that the Worker's Compensation Act
does not protect a co-employee from liability for willful, wanton, and reckless negligence. Id. at 716,
325 S.E.2d at 249. For a further discussion of Pleasant, see Note, Pleasant v. Johnson: The North
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theory of wrongful release. 16 Citing with approval an analogous Georgia case,17
the court suggested that if a physician in the course of treatment exercises con-
trol over a patient and determines or should determine that the patient is likely
to cause harm to others, an independent duty arises from this physician-patient
relationship that requires the physician to exercise a reasonable degree of control
over the patient to prevent injury to others. The court held that plaintiff stated a
claim for actionable negligence18 against defendant-that Dr. Saad, by releasing
a patient likely to behave violently, breached a duty owed to the foreseeable
plaintiff and the breach of this duty was the proximate cause of her injuries. 19
The court's application of general negligence principles is consistent with
cases in other jurisdictions that have recognized a cause of action for wrongful
release.20 The legal duty a psychiatrist owes essentially arises from his or her
charge over an inpatient.21 This duty, analogous to that in the parent-child 22
and employer-employee 23 relationships, requires that psychiatrists take reason-
Carolina Supreme Court Enters the Twilight Zone-Is a Co-Employee Liable in Tort for Willful,
Reckless, and Wanton Conduct?, 64 N.C.L. REv. 688 (1986).
Given these precedents under the conceptually similar Worker's Compensation Act, the court
in Pangburn believed that to grant Dr. Saad absolute immunity under North Carolina law would be
an anomaly. Pangburn, 73 N.C. App. at 343, 326 S.E.2d at 370. This related North Carolina prece-
dent, along with case law from other jurisdictions, persuaded the court that § 122-24 granted only a
qualified immunity and protected state employees from liability for ordinary negligence. Id. at 46-
47, 326 S.E.2d at 372.
16. Pangburn, 73 N.C. App. at 347-48, 326 S.E.2d at 372-73.
17. Bradley Center, Inc. v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199, 296 S.E.2d 693 (1982). In Bradley plaintiffs
sued a private health facility seeking compensation for the murder of their mother by her husband, a
patient at the facility. Id. at 199, 296 S.E.2d at 694. During the husband's treatment, he revealed
that he would likely cause bodily harm to his wife if given a chance. Id. Nonetheless, pursuant to a
restrictive voluntary admission program, the patient was issued an unrestricted weekend pass by the
facility. While away, he obtained a gun and killed his wife and her lover. Id. The Georgia Supreme
Court found that the special relationship that existed between the facility and the patient created an
exception to the no-duty rule. Id. at 201, 296 S.E.2d at 696. The court held that under tort princi-
ples of negligence defendant breached its duty to exercise reasonable control over the patient and
that this breach resulted in the death of plaintiffs' mother. Id. at 200, 296 S.E.2d at 696.
18. The North Carolina Supreme Court has established that in order to find actionable
negligence,
"plaintiff must show that there has been a failure to exercise proper care in the perform-
ance of some legal duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff under the circumstances
in which they were placed, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the in-
jury-a cause that produced the result in continuous sequence and without which it would
have not occurred, and one from which any man of ordinary prudence could have foreseen
that such result was probable under all the facts as they existed."
Ashe v. Acme Builders, Inc., 267 N.C. 384, 386, 148 S.E.2d 244, 246 (1966) (quoting Jackson v.
McKay Gin Co., 255 N.C. 194, 196, 120 S.E.2d 540, 542 (1961)).
19. Pangburn, 73 N.C. App. at 338-39, 326 S.E.2d at 367. The court found that plaintiff's
complaint sufficiently alleged "both wilful, wanton or reckless negligence and intentional wrongdo-
ing" so as to preclude Dr. Saad's statutory protection. Id. at 348, 326 S.E.2d at 373.
20. See, e.g., Semler v. Psychiatric Inst., 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827
(1976); Hicks v. United States, 511 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Underwood v. United States, 356
F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966); Bellavance v. State, 390 So. 2d 422 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Bradley
Center, Inc. v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199, 296 S.E.2d 693 (1982); Homere v. State, 48 A.2d 422, 370
N.Y.S.2d 246 (1975).
21. An inpatient is defined as "a patient who is lodged and fed in a hospital, clinic, etc. while
receiving treatment." WEBSTER'S NEw WORLD DICTIONARY 727 (2d ed. 1980).
22. The parent-child relationship imposes an affirmative duty on the parent to control the child
and to prevent the child from injuring others. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 316.
23. The employer-employee relationship requires that the employer exercise reasonable care to
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able steps to control dangerous patients in an effort to prevent harm to third
parties.2 4 Privity between the psychiatrist and the injured plaintiff is unneces-
sary. Rather, a psychiatrist's capacity to control a patient forms the basis of the
duty, and the psychiatrist's failure to exercise reasonable control over the patient
justifies the imposition of liability for harm the patient causes.25
The capacity of the psychiatrist to "control," addressed in Pangburn, is
critical in wrongful release cases. Once a patient attains the status of an inpa-
tient, the psychiatrist presumably can exert control over the patient's conduct.
The psychiatrist's ability to observe the patient and thereby to obtain firsthand
knowledge of the patient's behavior, coupled with the right to enforce the pa-
tient's confinement, demands that the psychiatrist exercise due care when releas-
ing the patient. That control is critical to a finding of liability for wrongful
release was highlighted in Hasenei v. United States.26 In Hasenei, John Hock, an
alcoholic diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic, was released as an outpatient
from a Veterans Administration hospital.27 Later that year he voluntarily re-
turned to the hospital's outpatient clinic.28 Approximately one month later,
Hock, while under the influence of alcohol, collided head-on with plaintiffs'
car.2 9 Plaintiffs brought an action alleging that the hospital and its staff had
been negligent either in failing to persuade Hock to hospitalize himself or in not
pursuing involuntary commitment proceedings against him.30 The court stated
that before a hospital has a duty to control the conduct of a patient it must
possess the right or ability to control.3 1 Because Hock was merely a voluntary
outpatient, the hospital had no ability to control him and therefore no duty to
control his or her employee to prevent him or her from injuring others. See RESTATEMENT, supra
note 1, § 317.
24. The duty to control, as exemplified by the parent-child and employer-employee relation-
ships, is distinguishable from relationships imposing a duty to protect. The latter duty arises when
the relationship between the defendant and plaintiff is such that the defendant assumes a duty to
protect the plaintiff from foreseeable harmful conduct. See supra note 1. North Carolina has recog-
nized that a defendant owes a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect another in the landowner-
invitee, innkeeper-guest, and carrier-passenger contexts. See e.g., Foster v. Winston Salem Joint
Venture, 303 N.C. 636, 281 S.E.2d 36 (1981); Leake v. Queen City Coach Co., 270 N.C. 669, 155
S.E.2d 161 (1962); Smith v. Camel City Cab Co., 227 N.C. 572, 42 S.E.2d 657 (1947); Urbano v.
Days Inn, 58 N.C. App. 795, 295 S.E.2d 240 (1982).
25. The psychiatrist's liability to injured parties can be traced to the RESTATEMENT, supra note
1, § 319 which reads: "One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to
be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care
to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm."
26. 541 F. Supp. 999 (D. Md. 1982).
27. Id. at 1003.
28. Id. Hock underwent a thorough medical examination after his return. The examination
showed that Hocek's schizophrenia was in partial remission, that he was not taking his prescribed
medication, and that he was depressed over his son's recent death. Id. The doctor then prescribed
new medication to combat Hock's depression and scheduled a follow-up visit for one month later.
Id. at 1004.
29. Id. at 1004. At the time of the accident, Hock was driving his car on the wrong side of the
road without his headlights on. Id.
30. Id. at 1004-05. Plaintiffs contended that the psychiatrist knew or should have known that
Hock was an alcoholic who could not safely operate an automobile. Id. at 1001. In addition, plain-
tiffs alleged that Hock had suicidal tendencies and was dangerous to himself and to others. Id.
31. Id. at 1009.
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control him.32
In Semler v. Psychiatric Institute33 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit considered whether a psychiatrist could be liable in tort for
releasing a patient in contravention of a court order. By court order the patient,
J. Gilbreath, was to receive treatment and remain confined in defendant's insti-
tution.34 The judge gave the hospital staff limited discretion to issue release
passes to Gilbreath. 35 The staff, however, abused its discretion and issued Gil-
breath an extended pass without obtaining court approval. 36 In addition, the
hospital began to treat Gilbreath on an outpatient basis without court ap-
proval. 37 Two months after being assigned to outpatient status, Gilbreath killed
Natalia Semler.38 The court of appeals concluded that the state court's order
had given rise to a special relationship between the hospital and Gilbreath and
thus had imposed a duty on the hospital to protect the public by maintaining
custody of Gilbreath until he was released by judicial action.39 Because Semler
had been a foreseeable victim of defendant's breach of that duty, the hospital
was liable in tort.4°
The Semler decision illustrates that the degree and manner of a therapist's
control over a patient is often a key factor in negligent release cases. A decision
to release a patient ordinarily is measured by the "normally prudent psychia-
trist" standard of care.4 1 Because the decision to release Gilbreath contravened
the state court's explicit instructions, however, the court applied a negligenceper
se analysis.4 2 Thus, the staff's violation of the court order foreclosed further
evaluation of the reasonableness of its conduct.4 3 Under this reasoning, a psy-
chiatrist who is not negligent in releasing a patient but who does so in violation
of a court order 44 may incur liability for harm the patient commits. 4 5 This
approach raises questions about the appropriate level of judicial intervention in
32. Id. at 1011-12.
33. 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976).
34. Id. at 123.
35. The state judge approved a plan whereby Gilbreath would become a day care patient. Gil-
breath was to receive psychiatric treatment during the day, while being placed under parental care
for nights and weekends. Id.
36. Id. at 123-24. Gilbreath was issued a three-day pass and a fourteen-day pass to visit Ohio
and investigate the possibility of moving there. Id.
37. Id. at 124.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 125. The court relied on REsTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 319, to find that defendant
had a duty to control Gilbreath. See supra note 25.
40. Semler, 538 F.2d at 126.
41. Comment, supra note 6, at 218.
42. Comment, supra note 6, at 218.
43. Comment, supra note 6, at 218.
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-277(a) (Supp. 1985) allows the attending physician to discharge a
committed person unconditionally when the physician determines inpatient commitment no longer
is needed. Subsection (b) provides that the attending physician must receive court approval before
releasing a patient who was committed after being charged with a violent crime and found not guilty
by reason of insanity. Id. § 122C-277(b).
45. Comment, supra note 6, at 219-21.
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psychiatric decisionmaking 46 and illustrates how liability for wrongful release
may inhibit therapists' willingness to release patients.
A few courts have refused to hold psychiatrists liable for harm their pa-
tients cause. In Sherrill v. Wilson 47 an involuntarily committed patient was re-
leased on a two-day pass. When the patient failed to return to the hospital, no
hospital employee sought his return.48 The patient subsequently killed a boy by
shooting him in the head eleven times with a rifle.4 9 Addressing plaintiff's claim
of wrongful release,50 the Missouri Supreme Court held that a psychiatrist owes
no duty to the general public with regard to a patient's release.5 1 The court
stated that liability for wrongful release would have a deleterious effect on the
public service rendered by psychiatrists. 52 The court therefore concluded that
when a psychiatrist negligently releases a patient, he or she should not be held
liable even for foreseeable damages.53
Although Sherrill is not in accord with North Carolina's approach to
wrongful release actions, it does raise important questions regarding psychia-
trists' liability to third parties. First, in those jurisdictions that do recognize a
cause of action for wrongful release, what standard of care must a psychiatrist
exercise to escape liability for harm caused by a patient? Second, does a cause of
action for wrongful release outweigh the policy interests in favor of deinstitu-
tionalization of the mentally ill?
The North Carolina Court of Appeals' application of traditional negligence
principles in Pangburn implies that when deciding to release a patient, a psychia-
trist must exercise that degree of care ordinarily practiced by the psychiatric
profession. This approach is consistent with the recent enactment of the Mental
Health, Mental Retardation, and Substance Abuse Act54 (Mental Health Act),
which codifies what is apparently a "customary practice" standard5 5 for state
mental health employees. The relevant provision affecting liability to third par-
ties states:
46. One author argues that judicial oversight of day-to-day decisions would inhibit the develop-
ment of effective release programs. Comment, supra note 6, at 219-21.
47. 653 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1983).
48. Id. at 662.
49. Id.
50. Plaintiff also sought to hold defendants liable for negligently failing to secure the patient's
return to custody. Id. at 667. The court concluded that it was in the public interest to deny liability
against public employees who fail to secure the return to custody of a temporarily released mental
patient. Id. at 669.
51. Id. at 664.
52. The court emphasized that psychiatric patients benefit by being placed in the least restric-
tive environment. Id. Imposing liability for a physician's negligent judgment to release would en-
courage psychiatrists to keep patients in a more restrictive setting. Id.
53. Id. at 667.
54. Mental Health, Mental Retardation, and Substance Abuse Act of 1985, ch. 589, 1985 N.C.
Sess. Laws 299 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122C-1 to -433 (Supp. 1985)).
55. The formulation of a customary practice standard recognizes the superior skill, knowledge,
and training of a professional. Byrd, The North Carolina Medical Malpractice Statute, 62 N.C.L.
REV. 711, 713 (1984). These factors are to be considered in the determination whether a profes-
sional acted reasonably. A customary practice standard is not only applicable to the professional but
also to any individual who holds himself or herself out as belonging to a group whose members
possess unique ability or knowledge. Id.
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No facility or any of its officials, staff, or employees, or any physi-
cian or other individual who is responsible for the examination, man-
agement, supervision, treatment, or release of a client and who follows
accepted professional judgment, practice, and standards is civilly lia-
ble, personally or otherwise, for actions arising from these responsibili-
ties or for actions of the client. This immunity is in addition to any
other legal immunity from liability to which these facilities or individu-
als may be entitled.5
6
The statute articulates a concept of customary practice similar to the statutory
medical malpractice standard5 7 and incorporates an objective minimum stan-
dard of care traditionally applied in all negligence cases. 58 Although phrased in
terms of providing "immunity" to state mental health employees, the statutory
language clearly provides that state psychiatrists now will be liable for ordinary
negligence in cases of wrongful release. 59
The formulation of an objective standard of care in wrongful release cases
must necessarily take into account the unique characteristics of the psychiatric
profession. 60 The objective factors available to a psychiatrist when assessing a
patient's behavior prior to discharge are often tenuous at best. At present, the
diagnosis of psychiatric disorders is an imprecise art.61 Establishing an objective
standard for a profession in which schools of thought proliferate and dis-
integrate rapidly is a difficult task.62
A major assumption of an objective standard of care in wrongful release
cases is that psychotherapists can predict the dangerousness of their patients. 63
Courts usually have premised wrongful release liability on the ground that the
therapist determined, or should have determined, that a patient was likely to
engage in violent conduct if released. However, widespread disagreement exists
among courts and psychiatrists as to the ability of psychiatrists to predict dan-
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-210.1 (Supp. 1985).
57. The North Carolina Medical Malpractice standard provides:
In any action for damages for personal injury or death arising out of the furnishing or
the failure to furnish professional services in the performance of medical, dental, or other
health care, the defendant shall not be liable for the payment for damages unless the trier
of the facts is satisfied by the greater weight of the evidence that the care of such health
care provider was not in accordance with the standards of practice among members of the
same health care profession with similar training and experience situated in the same or
similar communities at the time of the alleged act giving rise to the cause of action.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (1981).
58. Cf Byrd, supra note 55, at 740 ("The objective standard is a basic principle of all negligence
law, which traditionally has been applied to hold the health care provider to the level of skill, train-
ing, and learning possessed by other practitioners in the field.").
59. The failure of a psychiatrist to follow accepted professional standards with regard to his or
her decision to release a psychiatric patient will subject him or her to tort liability.
60. The North Carolina Court of Appeals recognizes that psychiatrists are subjected to a
unique risk when they decide to release a patient. Pangburn, 73 N.C. App. at 340, 326 S.E.2d at 368.
61. Comment, Tort Liability of the Psychotherapist, 8 U.S.F.L. REv. 405, 409 (1973).
62. Id.
63. One commentator argues, however, that psychiatrists' inability to reliably predict danger-
ousness should prevent courts from imposing a reasonableness standard in this context. See Stone,
The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists To Safeguard Society, 90 HARv. L. REv. 358, 364,
371 (1976).
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gerousness. Most studies suggest that such predictions are highly inaccurate. 64
In the controversial decision of Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of Califor-
nia65 the American Psychiatric Association submitted an amicus brief noting
that, given the present state of psychiatric knowledge, therapists are unable to
predict reliably a patient's violent acts and often tend to over-predict violence. 66
Most courts, however, have rejected the argument that the difficulty in pre-
dicting dangerousness should relieve psychiatrists from liability for the harmful
acts of their negligently released patients. Instead, these courts emphasize that
the standard of care required by mental health professionals takes into account
the difficulties associated with evaluating human behavior.67 Regarding the
complexity of defining a standard of care for psychiatrists, the court in Lipari v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co.68 stated that
it may be difficult for medical professionals to predict whether a partic-
ular mental patient may pose a danger to himself or others. This fac-
tor alone, however, does not justify barring recovery in all situations.
The standard of care for health professionals adequately takes into ac-
count the difficult nature of the problems facing psychotherapists....
Under this standard, a therapist who uses the proper psychiatric proce-
dures is not negligent even if his diagnosis may have been incorrect.69
Lipari's articulation of an objective standard of care for the psychiatric profes-
sion should be applicable to North Carolina's "accepted practice" standard70
and to Pangburn's application of ordinary negligence principles. 7 1 Thus, if psy-
64. See, e.g., AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, Clinical Aspects of Violent Individual,
Task Force Report 8, 28 (1974) ("neither psychiatrists nor anyone else have [sic] reliably demon-
strated an ability to predict future violence or 'dangerousness' "); Usdin, Broader Aspects of Danger-
ousness, in THE CLINICAL EVALUATION OF THE DANGEROUSNESS OF THE MENTALLY ILL 43 (J.
Rappeport ed. 1967) ("The psychiatrist cannot predict even with reasonable certainty that an indi-
vidual will be dangerous to himself or to others.").
With respect to the determination of dangerousness, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3(l 1)(b) (Supp.
1985) defines "dangerous to others" to mean
[t]hat within the recent past, the individual has inflicted or attempted to inflict or
threatened to inflict serious bodily harm to another, or has acted in such a way as to create
a substantial risk of serious bodily harm to another, or has engaged in extreme destruction
of property; and that there is a reasonable probability that this conduct will be repeated.
Previous episodes of dangerousness to others, when applicable, may be considered when
determining reasonable probability of future dangerous conduct.
65. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
66. Id. at 438, 551 P.2d at 344, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25. The various articles cited in the amicus
brief included: Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 439
(1975); Ennis & Litwick, Psychiatry and The Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Court-
room, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693 (1974); Monahan, The Prevention of Violence, in COMMUNITY MENTAL
HEALTH IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (Monahan ed. 1975). Although the court in Tarasoff
discussed pschiatrists' ability to predict dangerousness in the context of duty-to-warn situations, the
ability to accurately predict violent conduct is also a crucial factor in whether courts will impose
liability on therapists in wrongful release cases.
67. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 438 n.10, 551 P.2d at 344-45 n.10, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24-25 n.10; see
Hicks v. United States, 511 F.2d 407, 415 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In Greenwood v. United States, 350
U.S. 366, 375 (1956), the Supreme Court recognized "the uncertainty of diagnosis . . . and the
tentativeness of professional judgment" in the psychiatric l5rofession.
68. 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980).
69. Lipari, 497 F. Supp. at 192.
70. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
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chiatrists follow accepted professional standards and use reasonable judgment in
their decisions to release patients, they will not incur liability for harmful acts
their patients commit.
A more difficult question regarding the applicable standard of care concerns
the definition or scope of "accepted practice." More precisely, does this stan-
dard go beyond the exercise of reasonable control over a patient and impose on
the psychiatrist an affirmative duty to warn of a patient's violent propensities?
No North Carolina court has addressed this question. However, a number of
courts in other jurisdictions have found that reasonable care includes a duty to
warn. The landmark case of Tarasoff72 was the first to recognize a duty to warn
third parties. In Tarasoff plaintiffs alleged that Prosenjit Poddar, a voluntary
outpatient at a student health facility, was examined by a psychiatrist and found
to have a dangerous attachment to Tatiana Tarasoff. 73 Plaintiffs further alleged
that Poddar informed his therapist that he intended to kill an "unnamed girl,
readily identifiable as Tatiana."74 In addition, evidence showed that the physi-
cians at the student health facility knew that Poddar intended to purchase a gun.
One of the therapists at the health facility notified the campus police that Pod-
dar was dangerous, and the police subsequently detained Poddar for observa-
tion. Appearing rational, Poddar was released shortly thereafter.7" Neither the
therapists nor the campus police warned Tatiana or her parents of Poddar's
threat. Approximately two months later, Poddar shot and killed Tatiana. 76
In holding that defendants could be found liable, the California Supreme
Court stated that "once a therapist does in fact determine, or under applicable
professional standards reasonably should have determined, that a patient poses
a serious danger of violence to others, he bears a duty to exercise reasonable care
to protect the foreseeable victim of that danger." 77 Recognizing that the dis-
charge of this duty will vary in each instance, the court suggested that the thera-
pist might be required "to warn the intended victim or others likely to apprise
the victim of the danger, to notify the police, or to take whatever other steps are
reasonably necessary under the circumstances. s78 The court based defendant's
potential liability on the special relationship between Poddar and his therapist,79
72. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
73. Id. at 432, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
74. Id. Tatiana was in South America at the time Poddar threatened "to kill an unnamed girl
... when she returned home from spending the summer in Brazil." Id.
75. Id. Plaintiffs alleged that the psychiatrist in charge of the clinic "directed that no further
action be taken to detain Poddar." Id. at 430, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 439, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25. The court emphasized that the conduct of
the therapist would be judged against the traditional negligence standard of reasonable care. Id.
78. Id. at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
79. Id. at 435-36, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23. The court cited to the special relation-
ship doctrine in RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 315. Reliance on § 315 in duty to warn cases is
questionable because that section deals with the duty to control the conduct of a third person, which
differs significantly from the duty to warn potential victims. When a psychiatrist is treating a patient
on an outpatient basis the necessary element of control is absent. See also Schopp & Quattrocchi,
Tarasoff, The Doctrine of Special Relationships, and the Psychiatrist's Duty to Warn, 12 J. PSYCHIA-
TRY & LAW 13, 20 (1984) (noncustodial cases presented by the Tarasoffcourt not easily reconciled
with the special relationships doctrine).
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which could support an affirmative duty on the part of the therapist to protect
Tatiana.s o
In reaching its decision, the Tarasoff court relied on cases imposing a duty
to warn in other areas of medical practice.81 For example, physicians must
warn a patient of side-effects of medication if the effects could pose danger to
others.8 2 Physicians also are required in some circumstances to warn others of a
patient's contagious disease.8 3 -The court concluded that Dr. Moore, by not
warning either Tatiana or her parents of Poddar's dangerous threat, may have
failed to discharge his duty of reasonable care.84
The Tarasoff duty to warn standard, although accepted by a number of
courts, 85 has been limited by subsequent decisions. 86 In Thompson v. County of
Alameda 87 the California Supreme Court limited the duty to warn requirement
to those potential victims who are "known [and] identifiable." 88 In Thompson,
the parents of a young boy sued the county for their son's wrongful death. The
parents alleged that the county had been aware that James F., a juvenile of-
fender, had a dangerous propensity toward other children.89 In addition, plain-
tiffs alleged that James had indicated to authorities that if released he would kill
a child in the neighborhood.90 James nevertheless was released from custody
and within twenty-four hours he sexually assaulted and killed plaintiffs' son.91
At no time did the County warn the local police, the delinquent's mother, or
neighborhood parents that James was to be released.
The court refused to impose liability on the County for its failure to warn.92
80. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 436, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
81. Id. at 437, 551 P.2d at 343-44, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
82. Id. at 436 & n.8, 551 P.2d at 343-44 & n.8, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23-24 & n.8 (citing Kaiser v.
Suburban Transp. System, 65 Wash. 2d 461, 398 P.2d 14 (1965)).
83. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 436-37, 551 P.2d at 344, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24 (citing Wojcik v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 18 Misc. 2d 740, 183 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1959)). The court also relied on several
negligent release cases imposing liability on hospitals or staff members for failing to exercise reason-
able control over psychiatric patients. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 436 n.7, 551 P.2d at 343 n.7, 131 Cal.
Rptr. at 23 n.7.
84. Id. at 442, 551 P.2d at 348, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 28. According to the court, the public interest
in providing protection from violent assaults justified the duty to warn requirement. Id.
85. See, eg., Mangers v. Gordon, 94 Nev. 400, 580 P.2d 481, (1978); McIntosh v. Milano, 168
N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (1979).
86. See Thomson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 753-54, 614 P.2d 728, 734, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 70, 76 (1980) (psychiatrist has a duty to warn when potential victims are "readily identifiable")
(citation omitted); Mavroudis v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 3d 594, 600, 162 Cal. Rptr. 724, 729
(1981) (psyehiatrist has a duty to warn those whose identity can be determined after a "moment's
reflection") (quoting Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 439 n.11, 551 P.2d at 345 n.11, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25
n.l1).
87. 27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1980).
88. Id. at 758, 614 P.2d at 738, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 80. A known and identifiable victim is one
against whom the patient has made threats of harm. See id. at 752-53, 614 P.2d at 734, 167 Cal.
Rptr. at 76.
89. Id. at 746, 614 P.2d at 730, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Plaintiff also alleged that the county failed to exercise due care in maintaining control over
James. Id. The court never reached the issue of wrongful release because the court held that Cal.
Gov't. Code §§ 820.2 and 845.8 (West 1980) immunized the county from tort liability for its decision
to release James. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d at 747, 614 P.2d at 731, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
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Although the children of the neighborhood were foreseeable victims of the as-
sault,93 the County had no duty to warn because there were too many potential
victims to warn.9 4 The court stated that the duty to warn involves foreseeability
of harm to a specific prospective victim who is "readily identifiable."95 In
Thompson no potential victim could be identified because James had made a
threat towards a general group. 96
Justice Tobriner, who wrote the majority opinion in Tarasoff, vigorously
dissented, arguing that the special relationship between the County and James97
imposed a duty on the County to warn potential victims about James' threats
and his release. 98 He emphasized that no precedent supported the "identifiable
victims" limitation; rather, the Tarasoff duty extended to all "foreseeable"
victims. 99
The foreseeable victims approach urged by Justice Tobriner is consistent
with traditional principles of tort law. These principles require a psychiatrist to
act reasonably in fulfilling a duty of care to third persons. Whether a psychia-
trist acts reasonably toward victims of a patient's dangerous propensities de-
pends in part on the number of foreseeable victims and the burden on the
therapist in having to warn these victims. Furthermore, the impracticalities of
warning foreseeable victims should not outweigh the fundamental principle of
compensating victims of negligence. For these reasons, a number of courts have
refused to accept the Thompson limitation, and some have even extended the
Tarasoff duty to warn.l°°
Because the duty to warn represents an extension of the traditional com-
mon-law duties owed by psychiatrists, 10 1 it is not surprising that Tarasoff and its
93. See id. at 761, 614 P.2d at 740, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 82 (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
94. The court emphasized that the class of people to whom a warning would have been given
was so large that the warning would have been ineffective. Id. at 754-55, 614 P.2d at 735-36, 167
Cal. Rptr. at 77-78. The court refused to impose a general duty to warn unless the individual could
be identified or the group of potential victims effectively warned. Id. at 758, 614 P.2d at 738, 167
Cal. Rptr. at 80.
95. Id.
96. See id. at 750, 614 P.2d at 733, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
97. The special relationship arose from the county's custody and control over James. Id. at
759, 614 P.2d at 738, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 80 (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 761, 614 P.2d at 740, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 82 (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
99. In Thompson, although a warning to the entire neighborhood or the public at large may
have been impractical and ineffective, a warning to the delinquent's mother, who could have taken
special care to control her son, would have been proper. Id. at 764, 614 P.2d at 741-42, 167 Cal.
Rptr. at 83-84 (Tobriner, J., dissenting). Arguably the Thompson court's limitation of the Tarasoff
duty to warn standard reflects the court's recognition that imposing this duty on therapists is a
substantial expansion of traditional requirements of due care. See infra note 101. By limiting a
warning to "readily identifiable" victims, the court was able to limit the extent of a psychiatrist's
liability while still upholding the duty to warn requirement.
100. See, eg., Jablonski By Pahls v. United States, 712 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983), in which the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that even though a psychiatric patient
made no specific threats toward his girlfriend, the patient's psychiatric profile was such that the
victim was sufficiently "targeted" to be in need of a warning of the patient's violent propensities. Id.
at 398. In Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980), the United States
District Court for the District of Nebraska relied on the Tarasoff rationale to find that reasonable
care may include detaining a potentially dangerous individual. Id. at 193-94.
101. A psychiatrist's control over a dangerous patient forms the basis of liability when the pa-
tient escapes or is negligently released into the community and subsequently causes harm. In duty to
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progeny have generated enormous controversy over the practical effects of im-
posing a duty to warn on psychiatrists. 10 2 Some commentators object to the
"duty to warn on the ground that tort law provides no justification for the impo-
sition of a duty ... when the treatment is carried out on an outpatient basis.' 10 3
They argue that "[o]nce the element of control is eliminated," nothing in the
therapist-patient relationship can override the no-duty rule. 1°4
Another persuasive argument against imposing the duty to warn has been
the need to maintain confidentiality between psychiatrist and patient. Confiden-
tial communication 105 is critical for effective treatment of mental disorders. Im-
posing a duty to warn on therapists destroys the patient's expectation of privacy
and undermines the therapist-patient privilege. 10 6 Therefore, the duty arguably
will make "treatment of dangerous patients more difficult, thereby increasing the
risk of violence in our society."' 10 7 To ensure confidentiality, North Carolina
law mandates that a patient has a right to confidentiality. 10 8 However, the
Mental Health Act provides for several exceptions to the confidentiality require-
ment. 10 9 The most important exception provides that a "responsible profes-
warn situations, however, the patient is usually being treated on an outpatient basis and therefore the
therapist cannot effectively exercise control over the patient's conduct. Thus, requiring psychiatrists
to warn potential victims, absent privity with the victim or control over the patient, represents a
substantial expansion of traditional common law duties.
102. Recognizing the detrimental consequences of a broad warning requirement, the court in
Thompson noted that "[s]uch a warning may... negate the rehabilitative purposes of the parole and
probation system by stigmatizing the released offender in the public's eye." Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d at
755, 614 P.2d at 736, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 78. These concerns are applicable in the psychiatric context
as well. Thus, imposing a duty to warn could impair effective treatment of patients by "labelling"
the patient as dangerous and unnecessarily arousing fear in others.
103. Note, supra note 2, at 379; see Stone, supra note 63, at 365-66.
104. Note, supra note 2, at 379; see Stone, supra note 63, at 366. But see Fleming & Maxiov, The
Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 1025 (1974), in which the
authors suggest:
wT1here now seems to be sufficient authority to support the conclusion that by entering into
a doctor-patient relationship the therapist becomes sufficiently involved to assume some
responsibility for the safety, not only of the patient himself, but also of any third person
whom the doctor knows to be threatened by the patient .... While the precedents for this
conclusion thus far have involved only dangerous persons under actual detention (inpa-
tients), their rationale would almost surely seem to include also a physician's assumption of
responsibility for outpatients. The degree of control would vary, and with it the protective
measures that could be demanded, but there is no reason for altogether withholding a duty
of care commensurate to the practical options open to the therapist.
Id. at 1030-31.
105. A confidential communication is "[a] statement made under circumstances showing that
[the] speaker intended [the] statement only for ears of [the] person addressed .... " BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 270 (5th ed. 1979). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3(9) (Supp. 1985) defines confidential
information as "any information whether recorded or not, relating to an individual served by a
facility that was received in connection with the performance of any function of the facility."
106. See Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 459-60, 551 P.2d at 359, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 39 (Clark, J., dissent-
ing) ("[A]ssurance that the confidential relationship will not be breached is necessary to maintain...
[the patient's] trust in his psychiatrist-the very means by which treatment is effective.").
107. Note, Psychiatrists' Duty to Protect Foreseeably Endangered Third Parties-Petersen'v.
State, 100 Wash. 2d 421, 671 P.2d 230 (1983), 18 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 879, 883 (1984). A contrary
argument can be made that imposing a duty to warn will decrease societal violence. By effectively
warning potential victims of threatened harm, adequate steps may be taken to avert possible violence
by dangerous patients.
108. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-52 (Supp. 1985).
109. A facility may disclose information if the client consents in writing to the release of the
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sional may disclose confidential information when in his opinion there is animminent danger to the health or safety of the client or another individual or
there is a likelihood of the commission of a felony or violent misdemeanor." 110
Although the statute imposes no absolute duty to warn of imminent danger, it
may, when combined with an accepted practice standard, 1 1 support the imposi-
tion of a duty to warn in the treatment of psychiatric patients in North Caro-
lina. 112 Moreover, the application of traditional negligence principles in duty to
warn cases would allow the adoption of a "foreseeable victims" standard 113 and
permit North Carolina courts to provide fair compensation to foreseeable vic-
tims while balancing the competing interests of patients, psychiatrists, and the
public at large.
As compared to the confidentiality interest in duty to warn cases, the recog-
nition of liability in wrongful release cases necessarily involves a balancing of
competing public policy interests. The goal behind deinstitutionalization is to
rehabilitate psychiatric patients through their integration back into society. 1 4
The Mental Health Act's policy is to implement "a service delivery system
designed to meet the needs of clients in the least restrictive available setting, if
the least restrictive setting is therapeutically most appropriate, and to maximize
[the patient's] quality of life." 1" 5 Consistent with modern forms of therapy,
North Carolina's "open door"' 16 policy provides patients with freedoms not al-
lowed under the traditional custodial approach.117 These freedoms may include
unlocked wards, home visits, community work programs, and a greater incen-
tive for outpatient treatment. 118 Although proven to be an effective means of
therapy, 119 the open door approach has been hampered by community fears 120
information, id. § 122C-53, or if a court issues an order compelling disclosure. Id. § 122C-54. Area
or state facilities may share confidential information regarding clients. Id. § 122C-55. The Secretary
of the Department may require disclosure of information that does not identify clients for purposes
of preparing statistical data reports. Id. § 122C-56.
110. Id. § 122C-55(d).
111. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
112. In certain situations confidentiality must give way to the public interest. For example, in
McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (1979), the court recognized that a psychia-
trist has a duty to warn. In reaching its decision, the court relied on several New Jersey statutes that
require physicians to report various contagious diseases, id. at 509-10 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 26:4-15 (West 1939)); and require persons with knowledge of crimes to report them. Id. (citing
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:97-2 (West 1939)). The court emphasized that confidentiality must give way
to the interest of protecting the public welfare. McIntosh, 168 N.J. Super. at 489, 403 A.2d at 511-
12.
113. See supra notes 77-84 & 97-100 and accompanying text. North Carolina courts have always
considered foreseeability to be an essential element in negligence actions. See 9 STRONO's N.C.
INDEX 3D, Negligence § 9 (1976).
114. Comment, Victims' Suits Against Government Entities and Officials For Reckless Release, 29
AM. U.L. REv. 595, 596 (1980).
115. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-2 (Supp. 1985).
116. The "open door" approach is implemented through programs designed to place the patient
in the least restrictive environment possible. For an excellent discussion of the development of the
"open door" policy and its nationwide impact, see Note, Liability of Mental Hospitals For Acts of
Their Patients Under the Open Door Policy, 57 VA. L. REV. 156 (1971).
117. See Note, supra note 116, at 156.
118. See Note, supra note 116, at 156.
119. See E. Gruenberg & M. Huxley, Implications of Rehabilitation, in REHABILITATION OF
THE MENTALLY ILL 181 (M. Greenblatt & B. Simon eds. 1954).
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and increased judicial scrutiny. 12 1
Arguably, the imposition of liability on psychiatrists in wrongful release
cases will impede the treatment of patients. Some commentators assert that the
threat of civil liability, combined with the tendency to over-predict dangerous-
ness, will result in the over-committment of patients and lead to a drastic reduc-
tion in release programs. 122 As noted by one court, "The effect would be fairly
predictable. The treating physician would indulge in every presumption in favor
of further restraint, out of fear of being sued. Such a climate is not in the public
interest." 12 3
Although a psychiatrist's liability to third parties may cause therapists to
err on the side of caution, North Carolina's recognition of wrongful release re-
flects the more important policy interest of public safety. The role of a psychia-
trist is multi-dimensional. Therapists not only owe a duty to provide effective
treatment to their patients, but they also owe a duty to protect society from
potentially dangerous individuals. 124 The adoption of a negligence standard will
allow the proper balancing of these competing policy interests. Moreover,
North Carolina's imposition of liability for wrongful release is consistent with
the fundamental principle of tort law to provide aggrieved parties with an ade-
quate remedy. A psychiatrist is not asked to be an insurer of the public welfare.
All that is required is that he or she, as a member of the mental health profes-
sion, exercise reasonable care when deciding to release a patient. Like other
professionals, a therapist must follow accepted practices and standards in treat-
ing the mentally ill. North Carolina courts, however, should remain cognizant
of the subjective nature of psychiatry and the inherent unreliabilty in predicting
human behavior. The recognition of an objective standard of care will permit
courts to weigh these delicate factors in negligent release situations.
Likewise, the adoption of an objective standard in duty to warn cases would
allow courts to balance patients' rights to confidentiality against society's need
for protection from dangerous persons. In addition, the application of a "fore-
seeable victims" test would prevent unjust denial of compensation to those per-
sons who fail to qualify as readily identifiable victims. The protective measures
imposed on psychiatrists in duty to warn situations would necessarily be influ-
enced by the particular facts of each individual case. Whether North Carolina
courts will define reasonable care to include warning of a patient's violent
propensities remains unanswered.
CHRIS MICHAEL KALLIANOS
120. See Note, supra note 116, at 167. The author points out that whenever a death or injury
occurs due to the release of a psychiatric patient, communities often demand stricter therapeutic
techniques. This community criticism, coupled with legislative pressure, results in the constriction
of the open door approach. Id.
121. Note, supra note 116, at 162-66.
122. See Note, Imposing a Duty To Warn On Psychiatrists--A Judicial Threat to The Psychiatric
Profession, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 283, 297-301 (1977).
123. Sherrill, 653 S.W.2d at 664.
124. See J. Tinsley, supra note 3, at 596-98.
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